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The law of patents has long struggled with the status of intent in 
determining liability for infringement. This struggle has recently 
been given a sharper edge by the emergence of biotechnological 
products with the inherent ability of auto-dispersal and 
regeneration. The question thus is whether a person on whose 
backyard a patented genetic organism has grown without the 
active intervention of that person is liable in infringement to the 
patentee of that organism. This article examines the 
ramifications of the legal conundrum and argues that upon a 
proper construction of the theories of liability in patent law, 
intent to infringe is necessarily crucial if the nature of the 
subject-matter of the patent makes it unjust and absurd to argue 
otherwise. 
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ADVENTITIOUS PRESENCE OF PATENTED GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED ORGANISMS: IS INTENT NECESSARY FOR 
ACTIONS IN INFRINGEMENT? 
Ikechi Mgbeoji1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Patent law has in the past two centuries exhibited an incredible 
capacity for survival in the face of daunting odds (Drahos/1996). 
From its earliest beginnings in medieval Florence and Venice, to 
its contemporary omnipresence, the patent system remains a 
study in resilience and adaptability (Mgbeoji/2006). Examples of 
its historical trials and triumphs include the British public 
outrage against monopolies with the resultant emergence of the 
Statute of Monopolies; the excessively predatory practices of 
patent monopolies of 18th century and the resultant introduction 
of compulsory licensing; and lately, the emergence of 
biotechnological industries and the consequent relaxation of the 
doctrines on patentability (Dutfield/2003).  
In its growth and development, the patent system has been 
influenced by the flow of capital to new industries such as in the 
emergence of the chemical industry in Western Europe; the 
birth of biotechnology in the past century; and the ubiquity of 
information technologies in contemporary times (Abbott/2002). 
Put simply, there is a persuasive school of thought that argues 
that doctrines and principles of patent law often reflect the 
prevailing self-interests of influential and powerful industrial 
interests. (Anderfelt/1971). As a recent commentator observed, 
the history of technological industries “recounts how these 
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corporations have affected and been affected by the development 
of intellectual property law not just recently but going over back 
over a century, and have helped to shape the intellectual 
property (IP) regimes in many countries and internationally in 
very fundamental ways that today’s policy makers ought to be 
aware of” (Dutfield/2003).   
Of course, the processes in which powerful corporations and 
their parent states influence patent doctrine are not without 
controversy (Reddick/2004). It is plausible that with the 
exception of the anti-patent movement that swept across 
Western Europe and the United States in the late nineteenth 
century, no other threat to the existence of the patent system 
has been as dire as various technological challenges that often 
stretch the principles and doctrines of patent law to incredulous 
lengths (Acharya/1999). In this context, a contemporary issue 
and one in which the influence of powerful corporate entities is 
implicated is whether intent is part of the law on patent 
infringement. In particular, is a person who by no individual 
fault comes into possession of adventitious patented genetic 
material (e.g., through the accidental, or adventitious appearance 
of a genetically modified organism) be liable to the patentee in 
infringement?  
This question arises because of the unique ability of certain 
biotechnological inventions to escape the control of their lawful 
owners (Bent., et al/1987). Biotechnological products, 
particularly, transgenic products, are unique at least in one 
respect: they can, and do replicate themselves in a manner 
outside the control of either the patent holder or the alleged 
infringer (Bud/1993). The status or lack thereof of intent in the 
law on infringement of patents with particular respect to 
adventitious genetic material is one that has recently aroused 
the interest of some scholars. (Cullet/2005). This in turn 
compels a re-consideration of the traditional law on 
infringement of patents. 
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Patent law grants a patentee, the exclusive authority to make, 
sell, use, construct or otherwise exercise proprietary control 
over the subject-matter of the patent (Roughton/ 2006). In effect, 
any person who without the consent and permission of the 
patentee, makes, sells, uses, constructs or otherwise exercises 
proprietary control over the subject-matter of a valid patent has 
infringed the patent and is potentially liable to the patentee. 
Infringement does not cover a product as such; it covers acts 
relating to a product such as making it, dealing with it, keeping 
it or by such other acts that interferes with the rights of the 
patent holder. Without overstating the importance of the issue, 
the “core of any system of patents is infringement” (Roughton, 
et al/ 2005).  
Although the element of intent in infringement of patents has 
largely been dealt with by the courts for decades largely in 
relation to the assessment of damages, traditional patent law 
doctrine has long been of the view that in most cases, intent is 
irrelevant when considering the issue of infringement. However, 
none of the old cases have dealt with the issue in relation to the 
specific question of whether the old doctrine is sensible with 
respect to adventitious genetic material. Two recent cases from 
Canada--Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser; Hoffman v. 
Monsanto Canada Inc. (currently under appeal)- somewhat 
broached the issue. In Monsanto v. Schmeiser, Monsanto 
successfully argued that ownership of a patent for a molecularly 
engineered plant patent gene and transgenic plant seed entitled 
it to full control over stray plants and progeny containing the 
gene. The flip side of the argument, that is, whether the 
patentee is equally responsible for any damage caused by 
patented stray genetic material was raised in Hoffman v. 
Monsanto. Although the merits of this argument has not yet 
been tested in the courts,(Glenn/2003) it would suffice to note 
that a patentee is hardly responsible for any wrongful use of or 
damage caused by an invention to third-parties (c/f deBeer/2007) 
.  
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The narrow issue which this paper seeks to explore is whether 
traditional patent law’s stance on intent in relation to 
infringement is sensible when applied to adventitious patented 
GMO’s. In other words, to be liable in infringement, would a 
plaintiff have to show that the authorised making, selling, or 
using of the patented GMO by the defendant was intentional? 
Conversely, would a defendant escape liability in infringement 
by showing that the subject-matter of the patent came into 
his/her possession without his/her knowledge? Towards a 
careful examination of this issue, this short paper is divided into 
4 parts including the introduction. Part 2 examines the doctrines 
and legal principles governing the construction of claims in 
patent law. In the determination of whether an act of 
infringement has occurred with respect to a valid patent, the 
first task is to identify and delimit the scope of property rights 
to which the patent holder is entitled. Thereafter, the fact finder 
proceeds to determine the subordinate issue of whether the acts 
complained of has interfered with the rights of the patent 
holder. With patented genetic products capable of escaping from 
the control of a patent holder or a lawful licensee, the second 
aspect of infringement raises peculiar problems, especially, the 
element of intent. Part 2 thus seeks to settle the question of 
whether infringement is absolutely a strict liability tort (strict 
liability involves liability even where there is no fault or 
carelessness) or whether there are circumstances in which intent 
to infringe is a necessary element in a case of infringement.  
Part 3 takes the analysis further by exploring the peculiarities of 
self-dispersible and adventitious patented GMOs. In addition, 
part 3 contends that if the patented GMO is an adventitious 
type, it stands to reason that intent to infringe is a relevant issue 
and as such, no reasonable tribunal may make a finding of 
liability without resolving the issue of intent. Part 4 concludes 
the analysis with an observation that modern patent law would 
need to be revised to accommodate the justice of ensuring that 
innocent defendants who for no fault of theirs find patented 
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genetic materials in their possession are not penalized in 
damages (Siebrasse/2004).   
 II. INFRINGEMENT OF PATENT RIGHTS IN 
CONTEMPORARY PATENT LAW 
Although the scope and incidents of the rights granted to a 
patent holder are statutorily prescribed, the nature and character 
of such statutory provisions have necessarily been fleshed out by 
various judicial pronouncements. From the statutory 
perspective, s. 42 of the Canadian Patent Act provides for the 
scope and incidents of patent ownership. The section provides 
thus: 
 s. 42. Every patent granted under this Act…shall 
subject to this Act, grant to the patentee and the 
patentee’s legal representatives for the term of the 
patent, from the granting of the patent, the exclusive 
right, privilege and liberty of making, constructing and 
using the invention and selling it to others to be used, 
subject to adjudication in respect thereof before any 
court of competent jurisdiction. [emphasis mine] 
(Patent Act) 
By the foregoing, it seems clear that a patent seeks to protect the 
subject-matter of the invention from unauthorised acts that 
interfere with the rights of the patent holder (Whirlpool/1999). 
In short, a patent is infringed when a person, without the lawful 
consent, permission or authorization of the patentee makes, 
constructs, uses or sells the subject-matter of the patent 
(Apotex/2002). It must be understood here that the property 
rights forming the subject-matter of the patent are as delimited 
in that portion of the patent document generally known as the 
“claim/s”. The claim/s delimit(s) the scope and nature of the 
exclusive property rights granted to the patent holder 
(Freeworld/2004).  
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Consequently, when a question of alleged infringement of a 
patent is in issue, the courts refer to the claims in the patent for 
a proper understanding of the scope of the patentee’s rights. 
Absent a determination of the scope of a patentee’s property 
rights, it is not possible to make a determination as to whether 
or not an act of infringement has occurred. This distinction is of 
radical importance because two or more inventions may cover a 
similar subject-matter and yet not infringe each other if the 
claims are worded differently or the words used capture the 
essence of different inventions. For example, if a person invents 
a pistol and another person invented a telescopic rifle, both 
products, though covering a similar subject-matter—guns—may 
differ in the property rights of each respective patentee. The 
latter would not infringe the former if the claim deals with the 
application of a telescope to a gun. Thus, the words used in the 
claims and the approach adopted by court in the construction or 
interpretation of the words are crucial in determining whether 
or not an infringement has occurred.  
In the biochemical or pharmaceutical fields, differences in the 
words used in the claims can be very significant, indeed, radical. 
For example, Prof. Daly and the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) own US patent# 5,565,573 on synthesis of epibatidine and 
analogs thereof; US patent #5,545,741 for the process of 
preparing of epibatidine; US patent #5,510,490 for the process of 
the preparation of epibatidine, and US patent # 5,314, 899 for 
epibatidine and derivatives plus compositions and methods of 
treating pain. On the other hand, Abbott Laboratories owns US 
Patent #6,133,253 on the use of epibatidine derivatives for 
treatment of pain while UCB SA of Belgium owns patent # 
6,177,451 & 6,077,846 claiming use of epibatidine for treating 
nicotine addiction, Tourette’s syndrome, Parkinson’s disease, 
and Alzheimer’s disease. All the patents relate one way or 
another to epibatidine but differ significantly on the many 
potential uses of and methods of making epipatidine. Invariably, 
it is the claim(s) in the patent that define the scope of property 
rights granted to a patent-holder. Claims that have been drafted 
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widely are more likely to be infringed than those with narrow 
claims. (Mgbeoji: 2003)  
Given the central role of claims in the determination of 
infringement cases, the important question that falls for 
determination is: how do the courts interpret claims? As earlier 
noted, finding infringement is both an issue of law and of fact. 
While the interpretation of the scope of claims is a question of 
law, the determination of whether the defendant’s conduct falls 
within or outside of the lawfully delimited scope of the patent 
rights of the patentee is in itself a question of fact 
(Freeworld/2004).  
With respect to the former, various courts in diverse 
jurisdictions have in the past century, grappled with the 
appropriate approach to the construction of claims and thus, the 
determination of infringement. In the United States, for 
example, the “pith and marrow” approach held sway for decades 
(Graver Tank/1950). The pith and marrow approach posits that 
an infringement occurs when a defendant unlawfully takes, 
makes, and uses the pith and marrow of an invention. By this 
approach, courts in the United States purport to distinguish 
between the pith of an invention from the bells and whistles. 
This approach is also known as the doctrine of equivalents 
(Warner-Jenkinson v Hilton Davis/1997). In applying the 
doctrine of equivalents, the court asks and determines, “what 
constitutes the essential components of the invention?” If the 
invention is a mechanical device, for example, the test is one of 
mechanical equivalence. In making a factual determination on 
infringement, the test would have to determine whether the 
alleged infringer’s device interfered with the monopoly enjoyed 
by the original patented mechanical device. Similarly, if the 
invention is a chemical compound, the issue would be whether 
the patented substance differs from similar compounds of the 
same class (Warner-Jenkinson/1997). 
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In practice, however, the US doctrine of equivalents boils down 
to what is generally referred to as the triple identity test, that is, 
whether the alleged infringing article performs the same 
function, in the same way, and produces the same result as the 
patented subject matter (Graver Tank/1950). The triple identity 
test offers little protection when the alleged infringement 
pertains to inventions of great sophistication and subtlety where 
the slightest difference or nuance could make radical differences 
between the allegedly infringing product and patented product. 
Moreover, when the inventions at issue pertain to 
biotechnological products capable of drifting and regenerating on 
their own without human intervention, the limitations of the 
triple identity test become obvious.  
Although decisions in the court of one country are not binding 
on the courts of other countries, it is often the case that courts 
with similar legislative provisions often engage in some form of 
“dialogue” with one another (Hogg/2004). It is therefore not 
surprising that the triple identify found its way into Canadian 
patent law in the 1960s and 1980s (McPhar/1960) but seems to 
have been eclipsed by what is referred to in Canada as the 
“purposive approach” (the purposive approach seeks to 
understand what the purspose of the original invention is, 
having regard to the claims in the patent) (Whirlpool/2000). 
Since the decision of the Supreme Court in Free World v. Electro 
Sante, it is settled law that courts in Canada construe the claims 
in a purposive manner to determine whether the defendant’s 
conduct infringed on the rights of the patent holder. In England, 
the current approach seems to be the natural construction route 
(that is, a process whereby the words used in the patent claims 
are given their natural and ordinary meaning as understood by 
persons skilled in the relevant art) advocated by Lord Hoffman 
in Kirim-Amgen [Kirim-Amgen/2004].  
Regardless of which interpretive approach a court chooses to 
apply, once the court comes to a conclusion as to the scope of 
property rights conferred on the patentee, the alleged infringing 
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acts of the defendant would then be examined to see if those 
acts in fact amount to infringement. None of the interpretive 
approaches to claims construction throws any direct light on 
whether intent is required to prove infringement in cases 
involving adventitious GMOs. One may also wonder whether it 
is really necessary in cases of infringement of genetic patents 
that a court should consider the element of intent. This doubt 
arises because a general survey of court decisions in either the 
US or Canada on infringement yields the impression that 
infringement is unquestionably a strict liability tort. Indeed, 
ignorance of the law is an ambiguous point of law in 
infringement cases.   
To resolve the ambiguity, a distinction must be drawn between 
ignorance of the legal consequences of the act in question on the 
one hand and the absence of intent on the part of the alleged 
infringer on the other hand. Like in most cases, ignorance of the 
law, and thus of the legal consequences of an act is no excuse. 
Thus a person who consciously conducts certain activities 
incompatible with the rights of a patentee, although s/he was 
oblivious of the legal consequences of such an act cannot escape 
liability on infringement by pleading his ignorance of the legal 
consequences of acts of infringement. It is therefore natural that 
in the reasoning of both Canadian and American courts in cases 
of infringement of patents, little or scant regard has been paid to 
the ignorance of the infringer of the legal consequences of the 
infringing acts. 
Generally speaking, for liability to exist in patent infringement, 
intent is not relevant (Blair & Cotter/2002). For this apparent 
reason, patent infringement is often characterized as a strict 
liability tort. However, this characterization is only partially 
correct. To the extent that a defendant may be held liable 
without having any notice, prior to the filing of an infringement 
action, that his/her conduct was infringing, the tort of 
infringement may be described as one of strict liability. On the 
face of it thus, unintentional or inadvertent infringement is not 
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a defense to a patent infringement. Thus, generally speaking, a 
court may enjoin a defendant even if the only notice the 
defendant had about the patent in issue was the actual writ 
commencing the infringement action.  
In some cases, however, there are both statutory and judicial 
bases in some jurisdictions such as the US and England for the 
view that infringement is an objective as opposed to an 
unforgiving regime of strict liability. First, in the US, while 
assessing damages for infringement, courts take into account the 
element of intent. Indeed, in such cases, courts subscribe to the 
test of “whether the infringer, acting in good faith and upon due 
inquiry, has sound reason to believe that it had the right to act 
in the manner found to be infringing” (SRI Int. v. Advanced 
Technology Lab/1997).  
Second, and with specific regard to the finding of liability in 
infringement, courts in England have held that in cases 
pertaining to the use of a process, intent is required to show that 
the putative infringer knows or it is obvious to a reasonable 
person in the circumstances that the use of the process is 
infringing (Roughton/2006). Third, in cases pertaining to 
supplying means of putting a patented invention into practice, 
intent is equally required to prove that the putative infringer 
knows or it is obvious to a reasonable person in the 
circumstances that the supply of the means in question is 
suitable for putting the invention into use and thus infringing 
(Adams/2006). Thus, with respect to acts of infringement 
consisting of the unauthorized importation, use, sale, or offer to 
sell of unpatented products of a patented process, a defendant in 
jurisdictions such as the UK may be liable for damages if s/he 
has actual knowledge or constructive notice prior to the 
infringement. Fourth, in English patent law, intent is a crucial 
element in infringement cases where the patent at bar claims a 
product of which is to be used in a particular way (Merril-
Dow/1995). Generally known to UK patent lawyers as “Swiss-
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type claims”, such claims are of the form of “compound XYZ for 
use as ABC” (Roughton/2006)  
Therefore, from the foregoing, a careful survey of some pertinent 
cases from both US and England on infringement shows that 
patent infringement is not always a determination that is made 
without regard to the nature or characteristics of the invention 
in issue. It would seem that a dogmatic or indiscriminate 
invocation of the strict liability approach is not always the case 
when the courts are called upon to determine infringement 
cases. The nature and characteristics of the invention matters a 
great deal. Thus, it stands to reason that in cases where the 
character of the invention is not susceptible to arguments on 
whether or not the alleged infringer intended to infringe, the 
courts would naturally consider the issue moot.  
However, where the nature and characteristics of the invention 
are such as to raise grave questions on the intent of the alleged 
infringer, it is submitted that a court should adopt and apply the 
totality of circumstances test. This approach, already applied 
with respect to the issue of assessment of damages in “wilful 
infringement” cases is already well developed in United States 
patent law. As Pall has amply demonstrated from a careful 
scrutiny of case law in the United States, courts there apply 
certain criteria such as (a) copying of the patented product, (b) 
duration of the misconduct, (c) remedial action taken by the 
infringer, and (d) the defendant’s motivation for harm, et cetera 
in determining whether the alleged infringement was wilful or 
not.  
Put simply, in appropriate cases, patent infringement turns on 
whether there has been deliberate disregard for the property 
rights of the patentee. In such cases, the test would be whether 
the infringer exercised due care to avoid infringement. It may 
therefore be stated with confidence that although infringement 
is often dealt with as a strict liability offence, most of the 
decisions which yield this impression invariably relate to 
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inventions that lack the capacity for auto-dispersion and self-
regeneration, thus rendering redundant any need for judicial 
examination of whether intent is crucial or material to the issue 
of infringement. It is submitted that given that there are already 
well-established principles of law and instances where, as a 
result of the nature of inventions in issue, the courts require 
intent as a criterion in determining infringement, it is incorrect 
to assert that intent is completely irrelevant in the 
determination of infringement (Wright/2001).  
However, one should be careful not to overstate the element of 
intent in infringement cases (Blair & Cotter/2002). It remains 
good law that a patentee who does not market any products 
embodying the patent would recover damages for acts of 
infringement that occurred prior to the defendant’s receipt of the 
writ of summons. Naturally, the damages would be in the form 
of royalties, not lost profits (Blair & Cotter/2001). Be that as it 
may, it is an overstatement of the legal position to assert that 
intent is completely absent in determining infringement. The 
better view, in my opinion, is that there are instances, often 
dependent on the nature and characteristics of the alleged 
infringed invitation, where the state of mind of the alleged 
infringer is material (Beidler/1935). The question that falls now 
for determination is whether the mental element in required in 
infringement cases involving adventitious GMOs. On this issue, 
I turn to the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in 
Monsanto v. Schmeiser. 
III. ADVENTITIOUS GMOS AND THE ELEMENT OF 
INTENT IN PATENT INFRIGEMENT 
Regardless of where one stands on the debates on the manifold 
impacts of genetically engineered crops, a contemporary 
problem with such crops is genetic drift (Khoury & 
Smyth/2005). Genetic drift pertains to the inadvertent spreading 
of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) from locations that 
have chosen such technology to other locations that would not 
2007] ACTIONS FOR INFRINGEMENT OF PATENTED GMOS 13 
 
want GMOs (Repp/2000). Beyond serious environmental issues, 
an unfolding difficulty is the liability of innocent persons for 
adventitious patented GMOs that have drifted and germinated 
without the intervention of the alleged infringer. Of course, the 
flip side of the question is the responsibility of GMO patentees 
for damages arising from the genetic drift. Two cases originating 
from Saskatchewan, Canada, capture the complexities of these 
emergent legal questions (Phillipson/2006). This paper focuses 
on the former question.  
In Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, the defendant farmed a 
large plot of land with non-genetically modified canola. Many of 
the neighbouring farms utilized genetically modified canola 
engineered to be resistant to glyphosate, an herbicide 
manufactured by Monsanto. From all accounts, the controversy 
began when quantities of the genetically modified canola was 
detected on Mr. Schmeiser’s property. Evidence accepted by all 
courts involved in the litigation concluded that Mr. Schmeiser 
deliberately re-planted the patented GMO without obtaining the 
appropriate license. The majority of the Supreme Court found 
that possession of a plant containing a patented gene constitutes 
“use” and therefore infringement.  
By virtue of the Technology Use Agreement between Monsanto 
and contracted farmers, the court reasoned on the question of 
infringement that any person who knowingly “uses” a plant 
containing the patented gene without appropriate license 
infringes the terms of Monsanto’s patent. On the evidence, the 
court held that Mr. Schmeiser knew or should have known that 
the canola on his farm were glyphosate resistant. Although the 
essence of the invention lay in the plant’s resistance to 
glyphosate, the majority held that Schmeiser’s failure to spray 
his crop with herbicide was immaterial because of the patent’s 
“stand-by utility.” Thus, as the majority of the court reasoned, 
when Schmeiser harvested and replanted the patented GMO, he 
had knowingly appropriated or “used” a patented subject-matter 
without legitimate authorization or license.  
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Some commentators have argued that by the court’s reasoning, 
the test applied was one of actual or constructive knowledge as 
opposed to an intent-to-acquire (Preston/2003). With all due 
respect, this interpretation does not sit well with the evidence 
as accepted by the court. The concurrent finding of the courts is 
to the effect that irrespective of how he came about the patented 
GMO, Mr. Schmeiser deliberately harvested and re-planted the 
GMO. In effect, Mr. Schmeiser did not only have a constructive 
knowledge that patented subject-matter was on his property, by 
harvesting and re-planting the patented GMO, there was an 
intent-to-acquire the patented GMO.  
Nevertheless, the reasoning of the plurality of the court is 
problematic in one major respect. The problem stems from the 
fact that the “invention” in issue was the engineered plant’s 
resistance to glyphosate. Absent the plant’s artificially induced 
resistance to glyphosate, there is no invention to protect with a 
patent. Thus, “use” of the patented genetic material can only be 
effected by spraying the crop with the herbicide. Absent this, the 
crop is materially similar to the non-GM variety. To this extent, 
the reasoning of the courts in Monsanto v. Schmeiser overstates 
the case of infringement against Mr. Schmeiser (Cullet/2004).  
It is significant, however, that the judge accepts the proposition 
that where landowners ignore adventitious presence of patented 
seed, “it would be unfair” to hold such landowners liable in 
infringement. The court declined to issue a decision on this 
point because it assumed that Mr. Schmeiser knew or should 
have known that the seeds he saved were glyphosate resistant 
seeds. It is tempting to conclude from the judgment of the court 
that in determining the issue of infringement, the element of 
intent is otiose and indeed, irrelevant. It is submitted that a 
careful reading of both the trial and appellate judgments strongly 
suggests that intent is indeed an important element in 
infringement, particularly, having regard to the characteristics of 
the invention alleged to have been infringed.  
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It seems obvious, at least to the present writer, that the main 
reason why courts have generally not focused on the element of 
intent in infringement cases is that they have until the 
emergence of self-propagating genetic matter dealt with cases 
involving non-living and non self-propagating matter. The 
character or type of the invention implicated in an infringement 
is crucial to how or whether the court pays attention to the 
issue of intent. Where disputes involve inventions without a 
capacity for self-propagation, it would seem that the issue of 
intent would be too remote to warrant judicial commentary or 
analysis.  
 IV. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussions highlight the shortcomings in the 
present law and raise the issue of how best to re-articulate the 
position regarding intent in infringement cases involving 
patented GMOs with capacity for drift. It is eminently sensible 
that given the nature of patented GMOs that can drift onto 
someone’s property and repeatedly propagate themselves 
without human intervention, the element of intent in 
infringement cases is indispensable (Farnese/2004). It is for the 
foregoing reasons, and especially, the novelty of the issue itself, 
that in determining the issue of infringement in the Schmeiser 
case, the appellate court explicitly acknowledged that “the 
patented Monsanto gene falls into a novel category” because “it 
is found within a living plant that may, without human 
intervention, produce progeny containing the same invention” 
(Schmeiser/2002).  
It is telling that the court stated that it left open the question of 
whether Monsanto could enforce a claim against a farmer who 
inadvertently comes into possession of a GMO plant but does 
nothing “to cause or promote the propagation of the plant or its 
progeny (by saving and planting the seeds, for example.” Of 
course, courts do not determine issues that have not been placed 
before them. However, it is respectfully submitted that in a 
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hypothetical case where the patented GMO drifted to the 
property of an innocent party who takes no positive steps to 
replant, sell or in any manner purport to exercise ownership 
over the GMO, no action in infringement against such a person 
would succeed.  
Possession of a patented product, without more cannot be a 
sufficient basis for a claim of direct patent infringement. Indeed, 
in the American case of L.A. Gear v. E.S. Originals Inc, the 
court reasoned that “as a matter of law, mere possession of a 
product or machine covered by a patent does not constitute 
infringement, absent a threatened or contemplated use or sale. It 
seems implicit in cases on infringement that to be liable, the 
alleged infringer must possess the patented product in the 
expectation or hope of deriving a profit from it. Absent this 
qualification, patent law would be left with the ludicrous result 
that a defendant who unwittingly comes into possession of a 
patented item will be automatically held liable for infringement. 
Such a state of affairs is neither consistent with common sense 
nor in accord with ordinary notions of justice. 
Scholars are increasingly thinking their way through the 
complex questions raised by adventitious GMOs and the 
injustice of a strict liability regime for infringement of GMOs 
(Lichtman/1997). In a thought provoking paper, Stephen Maurer 
and Suzanne Scotchmer have argued for the recognition of an 
independent discovery defense in patent law. Under this regime, 
the standard of liability would be intentional copying (Maurer & 
Scotchmer/1998). However, the global minimum standards on 
patentability as articulated under the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Agreements (TRIPs) considers it illegal for 
states to institute the independent defence as part of domestic 
patent law. Similarly, arguments on the benefits of a negligence 
standard for infringement run into problems of high 
administrative costs and variations in the standard of care (Blair 
& Cotter/2002). States would balk at the idea of setting up 
bureaucracies to determine issues of negligence with respect to 
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adventitious GMOs. Standards of negligence itself would vary 
from one type of GMO to the others. At the end of the day, no 
proposed reform is perfect. Nevertheless, Blair and Cotter have 
made some interesting suggestions for reform that policy-
makers would do well to seriously consider. First, they propose 
adopting an “actual knowledge standard in a few discrete 
situations in which the policies that otherwise may favour an 
actual or constructive notice standard do not apply” (Blair & 
Cotter/2002). This approach would be eminently sensible in 
cases where the infringer knew or had reason to know of the 
existence of the patent in issue (Lee & Burrell/2002). There is no 
compelling reason why biotechnological inventions with 
inherent capacities of auto-regeneration and dispersion should 
not fall into this category.  
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